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REASSESSING US POLICY TOWARD IRAN
Iran is located between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Turkey, the Caucasus, and the Central Asian countries. Its central --and thus strategic geopolitical --location, its extensive oil reserves, efforts to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction (WMD), attempts to export the Islamic Revolution, support for terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, its high education and literacy rates, and its historic tendency to exert dominance in the region make it a country of immense strategic importance to the US. Additionally, the US must expect that Iran will try to influence events in post-Taliban Afghanistan and post-Saddam Iraq. Complicating factors that provide interesting opportunities are the growing desire of Iran's people to establish true representative democracy and the historical fact that Iranians are (and likely always will be) highly nationalistic. Given these conditions, it is critical that the US craft a realistic, comprehensive policy toward Iran that exploits the new strategic environment in which we live. The new US National Security Strategy, US prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism, and the US invasion of Iraq provide an opportunity for the US to develop a new Iran policy in pursuit of critical national interests.
In his book, Longitudes and Attitudes, Thomas L. Friedman identifies three American schools of thought regarding policy toward Iran; those who advocate rolling back the Islamic regime by pursuing a policy that would effect a regime change, those who hope to modify Iran's behavior by maintaining a comprehensive embargo against Iran, and those who advocate engaging Iran with the hope that increased contact will positively affect Iran's behavior.
1 The current situation may call for a multifaceted policy that combines elements of all three approaches. The implicit threat of regime change (conveyed through the removal of Saddam's regime next door and US encirclement of Iran), combined with maintenance of economic and WMD sanctions provide the sticks by which the US might influence Iranian hardliners, while constructive engagement may also influence hardliners as well as provide moral support to the reformists.
WHAT POTENTIAL DOES IRAN OFFER THE US?
Iran is a dynamic country, experiencing a struggle to determine whether government should derive its authority and legitimacy from God or from the polity. In other words, whose political authority is greater; God's or man's --a struggle the West waged during the Reformation and the Enlightenment. This struggle also addresses the issue of free will. Does man have free will? Should he be allowed to act on this free will if he has it? Or, is it the God-given duty of the clerics to mandate and enforce --to the most intrusive degree --how people in an Islamic-governed society will act. These are the sort of issues with which St. Augustine, St.
Thomas of Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, and others struggled --only the Iranians are doing this in the span of decades rather than centuries. As will be shown below, the impetus behind this debate appears to favor the demise of the hardliners' totalitarian control of Iran. This power shift could take ten to twenty years, but US policy will need to maintain pressure on the hardliners, assist the reformists, and position the US to take advantage of an eventual reformist accession to power.
It is important to understand that many reformist clerics, including the current president,
Hojjatolelsam Mohammad Khatami, are trying to achieve a balance between Islam and democracy. They are attempting to form a truly Islamic republic; one that is both Islamic and democratic. While some argue that this is not feasible, this paper argues that Islam and democracy are not mutually exclusive sets.
2 Furthermore, it is very much in the US national interest that reformists in Iran succeed in establishing a truly Islamic democracy because such a government could become a model for other regimes in the Middle East and contribute to long term stability in the region.
Iran is also developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities with the assistance of Russia, China, and North Korea. The possession and deployment of these weapons will facilitate Iran's accession to hegemonic power in the region. Short of an incredible improvement in bilateral US-Iranian relations (where the US could constructively engage Iran on the issue of WMD) or the use of militariy force, it is unlikely that the US will be able to forestall
Iran's acquisition of these weapons. Therefore, the US will need to develop a policy to accommodate this eventuality.
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It is also in the interest of the US to ensure that an abundant supply of oil from diverse suppliers is available on the world market. Iran has extensive oil reserves in both the Caspian and Persian Gulf, and has the potential to close the Straits of Hormuz, through which Persian Gulf oil flows. Consequently, Iran holds -at least in part -the key to establishing and maintaining an unrestricted, uninterrupted oil supply at low world market prices.
Iran's potential to strangle the Gulf and Caspian oil supply raises the strategic importance of Caspian oil for the US. It is in the US interest to ensure that the supply of Caspian oil cannot be constricted by Iran, as can Gulf oil. Consequently, American political interplay with Iran, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia has the potential to secure an abundant uninterrupted oil supply, as well as provide incentives for Iran to modify its behavior.
If Iran were to accommodate the reform movement, allow technocrats run the country and modify its behavior, Iran could hold the potential to become a country with democratic institutions (albeit Islamic in flavor), a robust economy that serves as an example to other Islamic countries, exerts a stabilizing influence in the region and is friendly to the US.
Furthermore, an Iran that respects international norms would be expected to drop support for terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command (PFLP-GC), both of which have committed terrorist acts against Americans. US policy toward Iran, then, should be crafted to influence Iran to move toward this condition.
Nevertheless, that policy will need to be crafted in such a way that it does not hurt US relations with allies in the region, and does not lead to the destruction of Israel. (W)hile the revolutionary leadership seemed firmly in command, a fierce struggle for power became evident within its ranks. The differences between the various groups emerged for a variety of reasons. These ranged from different interpretations of Islamic law to divergent doctrinal convictions arising from the inherent tension between the doctrine of the revolution and Iran's national interests. Different political considerations and tendencies and factional and personal rivalries also played a part… The various trends never actually organized into clear-cut factions -let alone into competing parties with coherent, collective ideologies. In addition there were significant sub-groups within each trend, all of them proclaiming loyalty to Imam Khomeini's 'line' (khat-e Imam). 27 Similar tendencies currently exist within today's "hard-line/conservative" and "reformist/moderate" factions. In addition, some of those the West considers to be reformist were not so long ago considered to be hardliners. Conversely, some of today's hardliners were considered previously to be moderates or pragmatists. This is true of Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of the Expediency Council, and even Ali Khamene'i. On the other hand, the rahbar has ultimate authority to veto or approve any law, policy, or action that the Iranian government might adopt and serves in that position for life. The rahbar ostensibly derives his authority directly from Allah and indirectly from the people --umma. Therefore, opposition to, or criticism of, the rahbar constitutes blasphemy, which is punishable by death.
A HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND POST-MONARCHICAL IRAN
As noted above, the practice of ijtihad is critical in Shi'a Islam in Iran. Ayatollah to give him the aura of having the required scholarly credentials to become a faqih.) 39 Ayatollah Shari'atmadari believed that ideal Islamic government was government of the people, or umma. He further believed that the role of faqih was advisory in nature, not dictatorial. Shari'atmadari opined that a true Islamic Republic is "a democratic regime based on the public will…government of the people, for the people, against dictatorship and despotism." Khatami's election opened the door for reformists to begin the struggle to wrest power from the faqih and the hardliners, and democratize Iran. Under Khatami, the debate has become more widespread and radical. Reformist newspapers flourished and the laity became involved. Ayatollahs Montazeri and Taheri are currently among the highest ranking dissident clerics.
Montazeri had been stripped of his title and pushed aside by Khomeini in favor of Ali Khamene'i due to Montazeri's audacity in questioning the validity of velayat-e faqih. Khamene'i put him under house arrest after he questioned Khamene'i's qualifications to be the faqih.
Nevertheless, Montazeri continued to issue opinions that were smuggled out of his house by his followers. Also, the umma and much of the ulema clearly still consider Montazeri to be an
Ayatollah-e ozma.
Taheri, a conservative, is concerned not about the concept of the Islamic Revolution or
velayat-e faqih, but about ruling clerics who have been corrupted by political power. In a letter dated July 8, 2002, announcing his resignation as the leader of Friday prayer in Esfahan, he blasted the regime for betraying the people and the Islamic Revolution.
As time progresses, the institution of ijtihad will broaden the debate and legitimize the reformists' questioning of the legitimacy of the velayat-e faqih, as well as the absolute power held by the hard-line clerics. The hardliners are in the unenviable position of having to declare legitimate the time-honored tradition of ijtihad, while suffering mightily from the reformist backlash ijtihad has spawned.
HAS US POLICY TO DATE BEEN SUCCESSFUL?
Despite 20 years of US sanctions and attempts to isolate Iran diplomatically, Iran still supports terrorists, still denies Israel's right to exist and tries to sabotage the Mid-East peace process, still pursues the development and acquisition of WMD; and still abuses the human rights of its own citizens. Clearly, the US has not achieved its goals with respect to Iran, except with respect to delaying the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which sanctions appear to have done. 50 While Iran has experienced gradual political liberalization, it is more likely a result of internal demographics and philosophical differences, than of US policy. 51 Also, while Iran's economy is stagnant, most analysts agree it is not due to US policy, but to Iranian ineptness, mismanagement, corruption, restrictive regulations and low oil prices. 52 US policy may have marginally induced Iran to be a bit more responsible in the international arena, but only insofar as it has forced Iran to establish economic and diplomatic relations with the EU, Russia, and East Asian countries -effectively rendering impotent the US containment policy against Iran.
Nevertheless, although Iran exports crude oil, it does not possess the capability to refine all the gasoline and other refined oil products that it consumes domestically. Consequently, Iran -OPEC's second largest oil producer -announced in March 2003 that it expects to import 1.5 billion gallons of gasoline in the next year. 53 Based upon this fact, one could argue that the US sanctions regime has had a limited impact on the Iranian economy, given that Iran may now be forced to raise domestic gasoline prices, causing inflation and further alienating the people.
One condition, however, does seem to be having a significant impact on Iran. Iran seems to be moderating its behavior due to its encirclement by US military forces and the threat they could pose to the hardliners. 54 The above notwithstanding, EU critical engagement with Iran also has done little to change Iran's behavior, particularly with respect to Iran's support for terrorists, its position vis-à-vis Israel, and its efforts to obtain WMD.
ISSUES
In discussing potential policy options, several issues must be understood. Among these issues are Iran's quest to acquire WMD (particularly nuclear weapons), its support for terrorist organizations, the issue of the world oil supply, and Iran's current encirclement by US military forces and allies.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE NUCLEAR OPTION
Possibly the largest problem facing the US vis-à-vis Iran at this time is the recent discovery in October 2002 of two sites -one at Natanz and another at Arak, Iran -that the US claims are clandestine nuclear weapons facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said that its inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities and plants have found no evidence to support the conclusion that Iran has a nuclear weapons development program, but admits that it has not inspected these particular sites. Iran denies that the facilities are related to a nuclear weapons program. • Bolstering regime standing in the eyes of Iranians and throughout the Arab and Muslim world;
• Intimidating the Gulf Arab States to follow Iranian guidance on issues such as oil pricing and production levels and undermining their confidence in U.S. security guarantees, thereby limiting if not ending U.S. military presence in the Gulf;
• Deterring Iraqi use of nuclear weapons in attacking Iran;
• Gaining leverage over Israel, the United States, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in a potential military confrontation or diplomatic crisis;
• Protecting oil shipments from threatened disruptions; and
• Undermining potential anti-Iranian actions in Central Asia or Afghanistan. 64 Schake and Yaphe believe that the US could manage an environment in which Iran possesses nuclear weapons by "reassuring allies; improving defenses of U.S. territory; normalizing relations with Iran before it becomes a nuclear power; adapting U. Given that US designation of Hezbollah rests primarily on acts it committed against US citizens in Lebanon, rather than its anti-Israeli activities, one needs to consider whether the US global war on terrorism will shift its focus to Hezbollah once Al Qa'ida is under relative control. If so, Tehran, Damascus, and Beirut should begin to worry. With respect to this particular phase of the War, the US may find it beneficial to differentiate its pursuit of Hezbollah for crimes against US citizens from its Israel policy. The US will need to make clear that apprehension of those responsible for planning, executing, and authorizing terrorist acts against Americans is the goal. Also, vis-à-vis Iran, the US should de-link its Israel policy from its anti-terrorism policy.
Specifically, Iran's support for Hezbollah activities in Lebanon and Israel should be treated in the context of the Mid-East peace process, rather than in the context of terrorism. That said, this in no way should imply that Israel does not have the right to self defense, and the US should make clear that it approves of Israel's efforts to protect itself from Hezbollah attacks.
THE NEW GREAT GAME OVER OIL
It has been the policy of both the Clinton administration and the current Bush administration to support the building of oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian oil and gas fields to locations that circumvent Iranian (and, prior to 9/11, Russian) territory. Recognizing the potential economic and strategic implications of pipeline diplomacy, Iran is working to attract investment to build pipelines that pass through Iran. 68 Petroleum analysts agree that building oil and gas pipelines that connect to Iran's current pipeline infrastructure would be the most economical method of moving petroleum. Nevertheless, there are significant political and economic problems with this option. Iran would be in the position to control the flow of oil coming from the Caucasus and Central Asia, thus making producers in the region more dependent upon Iran. Also, oil transiting Iran would likely flow to the Persian Gulf, making it as vulnerable as current Gulf oil to the closure of the Straits of Hormuz. Both of these limitations argue in favor of building several alternate pipeline routes in order to ensure an uninterrupted supply of petroleum to world markets. Baghdad?… The shadow of American military might will raise interesting questions for us… The US won't invoke armed action against Iran, but it will exert other pressures for change… It's really a psychological war." 72 This pressure can be exploited by Iranian reformists in their struggle against the hardliners, but the US must be careful in that the hardliners will likely find ways to use the US presence to handicap the reformists.
Another factor resulting from the US invasion of Iraq is that the US will control Iraq's oil fields and can ensure that Iraq produces enough oil to undercut world prices. Stratfor estimates that the Iranian economy could not survive a sustained price of less than $14/barrel because "it would bankrupt the Iranian energy sector. The economic hardship would probably induce a widespread socio-political crisis that could undermine the current government of velayat-e faqih.
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Given Iran's inclusion in the "Axis of Evil" and its encirclement by the US, Iranian hardliners would be well advised to be worried and thinking in terms of moderating Iran's behavior as a hedge. (That said, the hardliners could react by becoming more radicalalthough, for reasons expressed below, this paper argues that further hardline radicalization is suicidal and thus unlikely.) Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i acceded to power due to his political and survival skills, as well as pragmatism. Just as he understands the balance he needs to strike with the reformists in order to remain in power, he is likely to understand that he will need to compromise with the US -now poised on his front, side, and rear doorsteps -if he and the hardliners are to remain in power. Consequently, the US should use this opportunity to exert maximum pressure on the hardliners to modify Iran's behavior and reform its form of government by amending the constitution. In the immediate aftermath of the US removal of the Iraqi regime, the US should find a subtle way to make it clear to the hardliners that it is in their interest to reform, both politically at home and behaviorally abroad.
The US should also clarify, however, that the US does not seek the demise of the Islamic
Republic, but strongly supports the will of the Iranian people to reform Iran's political system by amending the constitution. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The US should use its encirclement of Iran to exert maximum psychological pressure on the Iranian hardliners. Iranians are instinctively bazaaris (merchants known for being shrewd bargainers), and the US is currently in a strong bargaining position. It is likely that a pragmatic Ali Khamene'i, recognizing the overwhelming firepower across his western border, will try to mollify the US. The US, therefore, should use this unique opportunity to move the hardliners further down the road toward reform.
While Iranians may generally resent the memory of the US-orchestrated coup against Mohammad Mosadegh, they also tend to hold a view of US omnipotence that is close to mythical in proportion. Consequently, the US should let the hard-line clerics know that resistance to democratic reform is unacceptable. Likewise, the US presence in Iraq may embolden the reformists in their quest, and the US should signal its enthusiasm for an Islamic democracy that is truly democratic, while remaining Islamic. In all of its communications with hardliners (and reformists, for that matter), the US should be sensitive to Iranian culture and understand the role of ta'arof (respectful speech) in Iran when conveying the US position.
Further, with regard to public diplomacy, the US should convey its appreciation of Iranian history and cultural achievements. Iranians are proud of their history and culture, and US acknowledgement of them will curry the favor of the Iranian populace. Iran to produce oil, public funds will necessarily be transferred from other sectors of the economy to help out the oil sector. Likewise, the US should use the invasion of Iraq to pump enough oil to decrease the world market price of oil to as close to $14 per barrel as possible.
(While $14 per barrel is an ideal, the US would need to work with its allies in the Gulf to ensure that at whatever level the price takes, the price of oil does not undercut their economies.) The US should follow this policy until Iran agrees to establish diplomatic, consular and commercial relations. At that point the US should begin to ease non-WMD related sanctions.
If Iran were to moderate its behavior, it would ultimately be in the US national interest to help Iran develop its oil exploitation capabilities to assist in improving its economy. In the long run, an improved Iranian economy would promote political stability, which would serve US interests in the region. Also, the increased supply of oil should help drive world oil prices down, which should lead to economic stimulus in the US by enabling Americans to use more of their earnings for expenses other than petroleum products. The US should hold out potential oil sector assistance as an inducement for Iran to moderate its behavior and to establish diplomatic and consular relations.
With regard to Iran's WMD threat, the US must assure allies within range of Iran's delivery systems that they will be protected from Iranian aggression and its WMD threat. The US should publicize a doctrine for an immediate, withering US punitive response to any Iranian nuclear, chemical or biological first strike against allies in the region, forge defense pacts with allies in the region codifying the obligation to execute such a response, and renounce such a first strike against Iran. The US might also find it useful to point out to Iran that although Iran may at some point be in the position to fire nuclear weapons into the US using ICBMs, the US would destroy Iran and effect a regime change were Iran to choose that option. This policy should make it abundantly clear to Iran that its accession into the nuclear club will gain it little or no leverage.
The US (using conventional weapons) would still be able to demolish a nuclear Iran with relatively little consequence to the US. That said, the US should keep in place all sanctions designed to impede Iran's acquisition of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons.
While these measures may be stronger than those recommended by Schake's and
Yaphe's, their recommendation that the reassurance of allies and sending of signals to Iran should all be done prior to Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons and ICBMs is sound advice.
They also advocate that the US concurrently work to deploy a national missile defense (NMD), which is also a sound idea. A great many Iranians believe that politics ought not to get in the way of doing business, and that the United States can be a reliable business partner… America is the key to Iran's prosperity and to its entry into the global economy… A small pro-reform newspaper, Iran-e Vij, argued that two decades of hostile relations with the United States had made Iran the loser. "For twenty years our nation has repeatedly and at every occasion shouted 'Death to America,'" it said.
In practice, our national currency has lost its value a hundred times over…and Iran has been turned into a major debtor in the world. Surely, this hasn't been the aim of our struggle against the United States.
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This passage would suggest that at least some Iranians believe that economic relations promise economic recovery. In a world where perception is sometimes reality, it may be more useful for the US to maintain sanctions until the Iranian regime unambiguously modifies unacceptable behavior and demonstrates that it can handle membership in the nuclear club responsibly. The US should hold out the promise of Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), but thwart Iranian admission into the organization until such time as it modifies its behavior and agrees to the establishment of consular, if not diplomatic relations.
Even the establishment of only consular relations would facilitate exchanges of views in both A more balanced approach toward Israel would entail cutting US financial aid to Israel equal to the amount of money it costs Israel to maintain old and build new settlements on the West Bank, and the cost of constructing "the wall." Only by affecting Israel's pocketbook and jeopardizing the stability of its economy will the US get Israeli conservatives to negotiate in good faith a settlement with the Palestinians.
With this as a backdrop, the US should at least contemplate a deal with Iran whereby the US scales back its economic support for Israel and Iran cuts its support to Hezbollah. Also, if the US were to give Iran a stake in solving the Arab-Israeli dispute, one might argue that progress toward a solution might be possible. Certainly, Iran's withdrawal of training, material and financial support to Hezbollah, Hamas, and others would serve to dampen their ability to carry out terrorist operations that serve to complicate the peace process. US inclusion of Iran in the peace process, however, requires accepting the possibility that some prestige might accrue to the current Iranian government -including the hardliners. While this might cause US hardliners some discomfort, this sort of carrot might reinforce in Iran's hardliners a sense that cooperation yields greater benefits than does conflict. This, in turn, arguably might lead Iran to moderate behavior the US and other Western countries find objectionable.
While this approach toward Israel and Iran's support for Hezbollah may appear naïve, it recognizes that for demographic and other reasons, time is working against Israel, and that Israel needs to look for the best deal it can get --while it still is in a relative position of strength.
In this context, the US can use its support for Israel to influence Iranian behavior and reach a
Middle East settlement that is equitable for both Israelis and Palestinians.
All of this should occur against the backdrop of back channel talks, then direct talks, and then normalization of relations. The US should support a robust propaganda campaign (through Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and its subsidiary, Radio Farda) explaining to the Iranian people that the US would like to normalize relations and befriend Iran, but that Iran's irresponsible behavior, instigated by the hardliners, prevents such normalization and the benefits that would flow from it. The US might even invite Iran, without the requirement for reciprocity, to open an accredited consulate in Washington, replacing the current "consular agent" arrangement Iran has in Washington today. Propaganda radio programs that offer US civics discussions -how the US government functions, explanations of the US system of checks and balances, and discussions on the Bill of Rights -should also be broadcast. This sort of information may serve to give Iranian listeners a paradigm for eventually amending their own constitution and changing the manner in which their government functions.
Ultimately, the US would find it advantageous to develop a close relationship with Iranperhaps with the goal of becoming allies again -so that the region's likely future hegemon becomes a friend, rather than a muscular foe. 
